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Interplay: Exploring Institutional Interaction
Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür
Introduction
Since the development of the Institutional Dimensions of Global Envi­
ronmental Change (IDGEC) Science Plan in 1998 (Young et al. 1999/
2005), institutional interaction has become an important subject of in­
quiry. The Science Plan put institutional interaction on the agenda of 
global change research when only a handful of scholars had raised the 
general issue. Their w ork drew attention to  the risk of “ treaty conges­
tion” (Brown Weiss 1993, 679) and to  an increasing “regime density” 
(Young 1996, 1) in the international system. Today it is widely recog­
nized that “the effectiveness of specific institutions often depends not 
only on their ow n features but also on their interactions with other insti­
tutions” (Young et al. 1999/2005, 60). M any environmental issue areas 
are cogoverned by several international institutions with governance also 
involving institutions at lower levels of societal and administrative orga 
nization (regional, national, local) (Young 2002b, 83-138).1
Although research on institutional interaction is closely related to the 
study of the effectiveness of international institutions, it takes a distinct 
Perspective and transcends the focus on individual institutions. Institu­
tional interaction is part of the broader consequences of international 
institutions occurring beyond their own domains (Underdal and Young 
2004). Exploration of such interaction supplements the traditional in­
quiry into the establishment, development, and effectiveness of individua 
international institutions. Focus turns to  the relationship among institu­
tions, however, whereas traditional institutional research addresses t e
relationship between actors and institutions.
We have m ade im portant headway in knowledge about institutiona
interaction since the inception of IDGEC. The IDGEC Science Plan
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identified three areas particularly worthy o f research: the role of politics 
and political decision making and their relationship to  functional link­
ages among different issue areas; specific types of interaction especially 
with respect to their significance for the performance of the institutions 
mvo ved, and the exploration and characteristics of interaction as they 
create synergy or disruption among the institutions involved (Young 
et a . 1999/2005, 64-65). We show th a t through a huge expansion of 
ot conceptual and empirical research, understanding especially of the 
secon and third research areas has improved considerably. Although 
IDGEC s contribution to  progress would prove elusive, 
as without doubt provided an im portant focal point and inspi­
ration for research on institutional interaction. N ot least, it has provided 
an important forum for the coordination of research efforts and for the 
exchange of research results.
O ur discussion of institutional interaction starts w ith a review of the
P ica progress made as a result of the study of horizontal interaction
mong international institutions. Subsequently we examine the theoreti-
^  ^ e, ° P™ent anc* ar§ue tha t we have m ade significant progress
f-ifi ^  3 t*ieory institutional interaction through the iden-
fvr>e« M °  3 num^er ° f  relevant causal mechanisms and ideal
nlovpH i * 1  We U,ltrOC'lJCe o^ur Principal strategies that have been em-
imnliraf-' ^ ° ra t' on institutional interaction. An analysis of the
national 0 lnst’tutlona* interaction for our understanding of inter-
DenultimafS ltUtl° ns anc* environmental governance follows. The
area o f ve I' exp o^res the progress m ade in  the specific research
that of hnr T eraCti° n’ Whkh has lar8e)y developed separately from
n u m b l of n mteraCti° n ' ^  attention to  identifying anumber of promislng avenues for ^
The Growth of Empirical Analyses
The number of empirical analyses of institutional interaction by both s 
cial scientists and lawyers has grown tremendously over the past  ^ ^  
This work has confirmed the importance, ubiquity, and diversity 
stitutional interaction. Interinstitutional influence significantly 3 
the development and performance of virtually all institutions. Gene ’ 
the empirical research has focused on a limited number of ‘ hot spots 
A large potential exists for broadening the overall empirical coverag 
Here we review progress in the most prominent areas of re s e a rc h .
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The W orld T rade Organization and M ultilateral Environmental 
Agreements
Trade-environment interactions are one of the “oldest” areas of relevant 
scientific inquiry. A num ber of trade-related multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) have been found to  interact with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). MEAs concern, on the one hand, the regulation 
of international trade, such as the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of W ild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Basel Conven­
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal, the Rotterdam  Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. On the 
other hand, MEAs, such as various fisheries agreements and the M on­
treal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, employ 
trade restrictions as an enforcement measure (e.g., Brack 2002; Eckersley 
2004; Palmer, Chaytor, and Werksman 2006). Driven by the expansion 
of the world trade regime to  cover, among other things, intellectual prop­
erty rights and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and by the emer­
gence of further MEAs, the scope of trade-environment interactions has 
also expanded (e.g., Rosendal 2001a, 2006; Andersen 2002; Oberthtir 
and Gehring 2006c; Chambers, Kim, and Young 2007).
Studies by social scientists and lawyers alike have highlighted the po­
tential for conflict between the WTO and trade-related MEAs and have 
identified potential solutions. Contributions have especially drawn atten­
tion to the ways in which the WTO, backed by its comparatively strong 
dispute settlement mechanism, works against effective global environ­
mental governance. The existing obligations under the WTO chill 
negotiations on MEAs because they constitute obstacles to agreement 
on environmental trade restrictions or limit the effectiveness of such 
restrictions (Brack 2002; Eckersley 2004). WTO obligations also under- 
mine the effective implementation of MEAs by protecting free tra e in 
goods irrespective of the environmental consequences of the underlying 
Production processes. The identification of the conflicting areas has 
led to the analysis o f various potential solutions, including mechanisms 
available in international law  (Pauwelyn 2003) and options for institu 
tional reform of the WTO (Tarasofsky 1997; Biermann 2001b).
M ore recent studies have investigated in more detail the response o 
MEAs to the influence of the WTO. This has led to  the insight that 
MEAs are no t as w eak in this conflict as they might appear at
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glance. Trade-environment interactions are not a one-way street because 
MEAs have proved surprisingly robust in influencing the WTO. Despite 
the chilling effect of the W TO, more than twenty MEAs comprise trade 
measures to date. Their proponents have found, and used, the room for 
maneuver to adapt to the W TO requirements while still pursuing their 
objectives with trade measures. Among other things this has led to spe­
cific efforts to avoid discrimination against nonparties (Palmer, Chaytor, 
and Werksman 2006). The introduction of trade-restrictive measures 
adapted in this way has in turn restricted the W TO ’s regulatory scope 
and authority (e.g., Oberthur and Gehring 2006b) and has triggered 
a aptations on the side of the W TO to allow for resulting multilateral 
tra e measures. This has produced increasing acceptance of appropri­
ate y designed MEA trade measures as reflected in the interpretation of 
the WTO regulations by the W TO Appellate Body and in the proceed- 
mgs o the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. As a result, no 
dispute concerning the implementation of an MEA has yet been brought 
before the dispute-settlement mechanism of the W TO (Charnovitz 1998;
1 aimer, Chaytor, and Werksman 2006, 187).
-i !! t^£Se resu t^s 'ndicate that the interaction between the WTO 
s is more balanced than some early analyses might have sug-
l - i r  , j  i'lcreas'ng number of studies during the past decade have 
f l ig h te d  the achievements of MEAs in shaping the balance between 
• • °  env*J'onmeilt. The emerging picture is one of an increasingly 
K n  'an<^  t 1^US reco8mzcd) division of competences and labor
bem een MEAs and the W TO (Gehrmg 2007). Certainly the current bal- 
f  n° t j  su®aenc or satisfactory, and tensions m ay worsen in 
■ UrC ase ° n t i^e Persisting societal conflict between free trade 
flirt- ,nVironrne)ma objectives. However, the latent interinstitutional con- 
a o o e J T H  ^  3nd MEAS hl§hll8hted -  — y early analyses 
flirt line °  r e een managec* relatively successfully so far, as the con- 
would n0t ecome acute; ^  lhis observation can be further confirmed, it 
of instii-r° V1 C| an catlon that the current decentralized management 
assumed" )° n! l intf raction has been more successful than traditionally 
assumed (see ‘Implications for Pohcy Making,» below).
Climate Governance
illustrates th e iterature on institutional interaction in climate g o v e rn an ce  
area The inr P* ? r , muIti' institutional nature o f  this g o v e rn an ce  
area. The international climate change regime that is based on the UN
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Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol has 
an enormous scope. As a result, it overlaps and interacts with a multi­
tude of other issue areas and institutions in a variety of ways. In addition 
to the multifaceted and multi-institutional nature of international climate 
governance, the param ount importance of climate change on the inter­
national (environmental) agenda has contributed to the emergence of a 
rich literature on the wide-ranging interactions with various other envi­
ronmental institutions and with institutions not primarily environment 
oriented.
A number of studies that have explored interactions among the inter­
national climate change regime and other MEAs have in particular 
highlighted the potential hegemony of climate governance over other en­
vironmental concerns. The objective of maximizing carbon uptake by 
monocultural forest plantations may, reinforced by the economic incen­
tives built into the Kyoto Protocol, defeat the competing objective of 
preserving natural biodiversity-rich ecosystems under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Pontecorvo 1999; jacquemont and Caparros 2002). 
The climate change regime drove the adoption, in 2006, of an amend­
ment of the London dumping convention that allows carbon sequestra­
tion in deep-sea deposits (International Maritime Organization 2006). 
Similarly, activities under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which helps fund climate protection projects in 
developing countries, have been found potentially to clash with efforts 
to phase ou t ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol to 
protect the ozone layer (L. Schneider, Graichen, and Matz 2005). At the 
same time the M ontreal Protocol has itself affected the Kyoto Protocol in 
various ways. O n the positive side, the M ontreal Protocol has informed
— t J  1— „
v*nous ways, vjn m e pusiuvc mv -----
the design of several aspects of the Kyoto Protocol and has contributed 
to climate protection by phasing out ozone-depleting substances (such 
as chlorofluorocarbons, CFCs) that are also powerful greenhouse gases. 
On the negative side it has led to a growing consumption of certain fluo- 
rinated greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol (Oberthür 
2001). Interactions with further MEAs, such as the Convention to Com­
bat Desertification and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, have been 
identified but not analyzed in detail (Oberthür 2006; van Asselt, Bier
mann, and Gupta 2004).
With respect to  nonenvironmental institutions, most analyses have 
addressed interactions with economic institutions and, in particular, the 
WTO. In line with the traditional trade-environment debate, the W TO
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compatibility of multilateral or unilateral trade measures as a means 
for climate protection has been explored (e.g., Charnovitz 2003; Bier- 
mann and Brohm 2005). In addition, the m arket mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol, most notably emissions trading, provide a particular an­
gle for the trade-environment debate. In this context the question arises 
whether and to what extent international trading rules apply to trading 
in emission units created by the climate change regime. Furthermore, 
the relevance of international trade and investment rules and financial 
institutions has become an issue, particularly with respect to the imple­
mentation of climate protection projects under the CDM  and Joint Im­
plementation schemes of the Kyoto Protocol (Chambers 1998, 2001). 
Beyond the core economic and financial institutions, the analysis of the 
interaction of the climate change regime with the International Civil Avi­
ation Organization and the International M aritim e Organization (IMO) 
in regard to greenhouse gas emissions from international transport has 
highlighted the difficulties that can arise from regulatory competition 
and a lack of coordination among international institutions (Oberthiir 
2003, 2006). Further interactions of the climate regime with nonenvi- 
ronmental institutions, such as the W orld H ealth Organization, have re­
ceived less attention (van Asselt, Biermann, and Gupta 2004).
Ocean Governance
Ocean governance is a third area that has attracted c o n s id e ra b le  scien­
tific attention. The prominence of relevant research is first of all obvious 
from the aforementioned discussion of both the W TO/M EA interplay 
and institutional interaction in climate governance, because ocean- 
related issues play an important role in both areas (e.g., W TO and fish­
eries agreements; IMO and climate protection). In addition, studies have 
focused on various subsets of the large number of institutions that inter­
act in manifold ways in this area of governance. The large number of 
studies exploring fisheries governance is particularly striking (e.g-> 
Stokke 2001a; DeSombre 2005; Stokke and Coffey 2006).
Research has in particular focused on a number of pertinent issues. A 
first focus has been on the exploration of the interplay of various insti­
tutions in particular geographical areas of ocean governance. Related 
studies have shed light on the interplay of various functionally differenti­
ated institutions in the governance of particular regions such as the 
North Sea (e.g., Skjærseth 2000, 2006), the Arctic (e.g., Stokke 2007; 
Stokke and Honneland 2007), and Antarctica (e.g., Stokke and Vidas
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1996). The aforementioned studies on regional areas of ocean gover­
nance have frequently also addressed the effects of the nesting of regional 
arrangements or functionally specialized institutions (e.g., fisheries agree­
ments) into broader global institutions, most importantly the UN Con­
vention on the Law of the Sea (Vidas 2000a, 2000b) and the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement (e.g., Boyle 1999; Stokke 2000, 2001a). Yet another 
important research area has been the governance of particularly vulnera­
ble marine species such as whales. In this regard it has turned out that 
the existence of numerous functionally specialized institutions creates 
opportunities for forum shopping that might be exploited by interested 
actors. For example, the protection of whales, usually pursued within 
the International W haling Commission, might also be addressed under 
CITES (Gillespie 2002).
Other Areas of Empirical Research
Noteworthy are two particular contributions by legal scholars. First, they 
have begun to investigate the relationship and mutual influence of vari­
ous courts and quasi-judicial procedures (e.g., Schiffman 1999; Shany 
2003). A recent dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom con­
cerning the UK M O X  plant in Sellafield has, for example, been ad­
dressed by procedures under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
the OSPAR Convention, and the European Court of Justice (Lavranos
2006). Formal rules on jurisdictional delimitation and more informal 
mechanisms (e.g., regarding information exchange) that minimize the 
risk of contradictory judgments and jurisdictional competition exist to 
some extent and could be further advanced to tackle these issues. Sec­
ond, legal scholars have analyzed the consequences that norm conflicts 
may have in general for the system of international law as well as the 
means that are available in international law to resolve such conflicts 
(Pauwelyn 2003; W olfrum and M atz 2003). The resulting legal analyses 
have highlighted that existing constitutional rules of international law, 
such as the lex posterior and the lex specialis rules reflected in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, are insufficient. The resolution of 
norm conflicts frequently has to resort to a case-by-case approach of 
clarifying the situation. As one result, many international treaties in in­
ternational environmental governance explicitly address the relationship 
with other treaties (M. Axelrod 2006). Jurisdictional norm interpretation 
has also played an im portant role, for example, with respect to managing 
the tensions between the W TO and MEAs. In other cases a resolution
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has to rely on the political rather than the jurisdictional process of norm
development and interpretation.
Other areas of environmental governance with possible interaction 
effects have received far less scientific attention. Only rarely studies have 
touched upon aspects such as the regional-global interactions concerning 
the North-South transfer of hazardous waste (Meinke 2002) and have 
addressed European air pollution as an empirical field (Selin and Van- 
Deveer 2003). Given the fact that virtually all areas of environmental 
governance are influenced by several institutions, there is furthermore 
room for many more empirical analyses of institutional interaction to 
shed light, for instance, on the governance of chemicals or the protec­
tion of species and biodiversity. Even with respect to  the WTO-MEA re­
lationship, global climate governance, and ocean governance, there is an 
enormous scope for further interplay analyses. In none of these areas 
have existing studies yet provided a comprehensive picture of the prob­
lems and promises of interaction. Also, studies of large numbers of cases 
that could provide a basis for comparative analyses have so far remained 
rare. To our knowledge our own research is the only example of such 
a large-« study to date (Oberthur and Gehring 2006c), although some 
scholars have begun to investigate particular aspects of interaction by 
employing quantitative means (e.g., M . Axelrod 2006).
Synergy and Conflict
One of the most noteworthy results of recent empirical research concerns 
the relationship of synergy and conflict in the realm of institutional in­
teraction. Whereas Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993, 15-16) identified 
more interinstitutional synergy than they expected, early analyses of indi­
vidual cases such as the relationship among the W TO and MEAs focused  
on conflict and supported the notion that institutional interaction is 
problematic. Evaluating 163 cases o f  environmentally relevant interac­
tion, we found in our own study that synergy is, counter to frequent as­
sumption, a t least as common among international and European Union 
(EU) environmental governance institutions as disruption (Gehring and 
Oberthur 2006, 316-25). The majority of our cases of institutional in­
teraction led to synergy, and only about a quarter resulted in clear dis­
ruption. Furthermore, disruption and conflict in most cases occur as 
unintended side effects rather than deliberate results. Undoubtedly con- 
lct is not negligible and poses severe problems, especially in  in te ra c tio n
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among environmental and nonenvironmental regimes; however, synergy 
dominates overall. Hence, the larger-« study points to a selection bias to­
ward the conflictive, more politically salient cases.
Moreover, collective action is taken much more frequently in response 
to disruptive than to synergistic interaction. Positive effects of institu­
tional interaction are commonly “consumed” without further action, ir­
respective of the potential for further improvement that may exist. This 
phenomenon appears to be widespread (identified in about 30 percent 
of our cases). A potential for improvement where positive effects occur 
has been neglected much more frequently than in the case of negative 
(disruptive) outcomes. The higher salience so far of problematic cases of 
interaction may be explained by the fact that people generally react more 
strongly to the risk of losses entailed in conflict than to the advantage of 
additional benefits (Tversky and Kahnemann 1981, 1984) and by the 
presence of aggrieved actors struggling for change. This suggests that it 
may be w orth investing effort to identify potential for improvement irre­
spective of whether the original effect of an interaction was synergistic or 
disruptive.
These empirical findings have important implications for current de­
bates about the reform of international environmental governance. These 
debates have been widely based on the assumption that conflict is the 
prevailing feature of institutional interaction. Concerns about disruptive 
interaction (between MEAs and the WTO as well as among environmen­
tal regimes themselves), incoherence, and duplication of work have been 
important drivers of both calls for a World Environment Organization 
(WEO) (e.g., Biermann and Bauer 2005) and more cautious bottom- 
up proposals for strengthening coherence and environmental policy inte­
gration in global environmental governance (e.g., Chambers and Green 
2005; Najam, Papa, and Taiyab 2006). The aforementioned empirical 
results require a review of the basis for discussion of synergy and disrup­
tion and specifically suggest the need for more emphasis on preserving 
and enhancing synergistic institutional interaction as compared to mini 
mizing interinstitutional conflict.
Conceptual Progress: From Classification to Causal Mechanisms
The IDGEC project has facilitated a number of attempts to develop gen 
eral research concepts. Sound concepts are a prerequisite for more sys­
tematic research on institutional interaction. Starting in the mi 199 s,
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the search for a reliable conceptual foundation for institutional interac­
tion has moved from classification efforts to more general propositions 
about the driving forces of institutional interaction and the deductive 
identification of causal mechanisms, elucidating both the pathways 
through which influence can travel from one institution to another and 
the consequences of interaction.
Categories for the Classification of Institutional Interaction
The search for analytical concepts started with a num ber of categories 
for classification. These classifications are useful for a first-cut explora­
tion of the field of institutional interaction and establish valuable distinc­
tions. They do not, however, capture the forces driving interaction.
Preceding the IDGEC Science Plan, Young (1996) put forward fo u r 
types of institutional interaction and began to explore their inherent 
dynamics. He observed that issue-specific regimes are usually em bedded  
m overarching principles and practices, such as sovereignty, and that 
ey trigger long-term processes of change in these overarching struc­
tures Institutional nesting addresses instances of interaction in which 
peci c arrangements are folded into broader institutional fra m e w o rk s  
at ea wit the same general issue area but are less detailed. An exam- 
P e nesting of the Multi-Fiber Agreement within the General Agree- 
on an  s and Trade (GATT)/WTO (Aggarwal 1983). In cases of 
institutional clustering, actors combine different governance a rran g e -
tin t j> m i?St'tU,tK)na' Pac^a8es eyen when there is no compelling func- 
,i r °  S° ’ as occurred in the UN Convention on the Law of
fnrmf-rl f ° ver a^P addresses linkages in which individual regimes
■ 1 erent PurPoses and largely without reference to one an- 
each nth erSeCt ° n a a^cto basis, producing substantial impacts on 
and rl fCr m 1 6 process‘ Young drew attention to the fact that nesting 
the in s rW 118 1Cal*y the result of intentional attem pts to redesign
uninten ' T  landsCape’ wherea  ^ embeddedness and overlap reflect
ar - In the preparr ry stasesof insrii-nti i -  ’ developed a taxonom y of different types
sponses to ^n ^  finteraCiti0n’ o^cused also on possible political re-
what surnrismp|Ut' r a mteractl0n- R°sendal (2001a) conjectured, some- 
of the institur ^  ^  1.nteractlon wilJ create synergy, if the specific rules 
to  t  2 2 : Z mVOu ed are COmpatlble’ and ^  / t h e y  prove
the in s t i,u ta s ' ^  ,ei’ evelopment of general causal mechanisms of
Interplay 197
institutional interaction demonstrated later on that the broader norms 
reflecting the policy direction of two or more institutions can have a tre­
mendous impact on the quality of effects.
The IDGEC Science Plan proposed to distinguish between horizontal 
and vertical interaction (Young et al. 1999/2005; Young 2002b, 8 3 - 
138). Horizontal interaction occurs among institutions at the same level 
of social organization or the same point on the administrative scale. 
At the international level this kind of interaction originates from the 
high degree of fragmentation of the international system in which actors 
frequently choose to  pursue their common interests by establishing new 
institutions rather than expanding existing ones. By contrast, vertical in­
teraction addresses the influence of institutions across different levels of 
social organization or administration. For example, the institutional de­
sign of domestic political systems shapes state interests and thus exerts 
influence on the design of international and European institutional 
arrangements (Héritier 1999). And global or regional environmental 
governance requires an appropriate institutional underpinning at the na­
tional and local levels (see Galaz et al., chapter 5 in this volume).
M ost im portantly, the Science Plan put forward the distinction be­
tween political and functional linkages among institutions (Young et al. 
1999/2005, 50; see also Young 2002b, 23). Juxtaposing political and 
functional linkages provides an initial idea of some fundamental forces 
driving institutional interaction, namely, deliberate political action and 
underlying properties of the governance targets for international institu­
tions that escape hum an control. A functional linkage was conceived of 
as a “fact of life,” “ in the sense that the operation of one institution di­
rectly influences the effectiveness of another through some substantive 
connection of the activities involved” (Young et al. 1999/2005, 50). It 
would exist “when substantive problems that two or more institutions 
address are linked in biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms (Young 
2002b, 23; also 83-109). For example, action taken within the ozone 
regime on CFCs is immediately relevant for the climate change regime, 
because CFCs have ozone-depleting properties and are at the same time 
potent greenhouse gases. Political linkages, on the other hand, involve 
the deliberate design of the relationship between or among different insti 
tutions. They were believed to “arise when actors decide to consider 
two or more arrangements as parts of a larger institutional complex 
(Young et al. 1999/2005, 50). For example, member states of the climate 
change regime assigned the operation of the financial mechanism of this
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institution to the Global Environment Facility, thus establishing a perma­
nent working relationship between the two institutions (Yamin and 
Depledge 2004, chapter 10). The distinction between functional and po­
litical linkages adapts the concepts of functional and political spillover 
from neofunctionalist integration theory (Rosamond 2000, 59-68).
This approach, however, is burdened with considerable analytical dif­
ficulties (see also Stokke 2001a). It underspecifies the realm of institu­
tional interaction, because not all instances of institutional interaction 
fit either type: unavoidable fact of life or totally deliberate political de­
sign. Consider that the difficult relationship between trade-restricting 
MEAs and the WTO is neither deliberately designed by the member 
states of either of the institutions involved, nor is it an unavoidable fact
o life because it originates from intended political action. The distinction 
a so overspecifies the realm of institutional interaction because the two 
categories do not denote mutually exclusive types. Young et al. (1999/ 
05, 53) take the protocols on SO2 , N O x, and volatile organic com­
pounds of the international regime on transboundary air pollution as an 
example of a functional linkage, even though all these protocols belong 
one convention managed under the UN Economic Commission for 
arC ^ US undoubted|y ParCs of a larger institutional complex, 
n a mon to functional and political linkages, other types of interac- 
, .C'an 1 ent'^e(i if a number of key factors believed to  be crucial for 
V rfu  0 |CatU>n causa  ^ Pathways are systematically varied (Gehring 
an ert ür 2004, 253-67). These factors shed light on different facets 
CJlt institutional interaction relating to  the causes and con- 
quences o regime interaction, the nature of the influence at work, and 
incf> ■ 6 rcsPonses- interaction can take place no t only because 
Z n  ,0n! « re funCtionally or Politically linked, but also because they 
her™ 1SC * erent memkerships, so that interaction occurs, for example, 
i r e i  T '1 3 regI° na anc* a gl°bal institution operating in the same issue 
on whffl'i ' Ctl° n ^atCcrns can be expected to differ profoundly depending 
other „ Cr ° r n(f  a ref me can unilaterally affect the development of an- 
atine with”^  ° Ut 1 6 consent’ or even awareness, of the actors oper- 
o b serv !fn  tar8et/ e8ime- Moreover, political action in response to 
tions involved1'01153^  mteractl° n can occur within either or all institu-
o f t Ï Ï T A ' Claf ifcati0"s ° f  ¡»teraaion ill,«,rate the wide variety
structure the field ^  SerVe 3S usefuI initial distinctions to
e istinction between horizontal and vertical inter­
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action is, like the distinction between synergistic and conflictual qualities 
of effect among institutions, now well established. Young’s four classes 
of institutional interaction provide an analytical framework for more 
specific inquiries; however, they have not been employed to  analyze the­
oretically the causal factors behind institutional interaction.
Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction
A number of authors set out to investigate the forces that drive institu­
tional interaction and to identify general pathways clarifying how the in­
stitutions involved are related to each other. These attempts have yielded 
insights into how  and under w hat conditions an international institution 
can influence another institution. Pointing to factors that might be im­
portant for causal analysis, these insights constitute a promising founda­
tion for the search for theoretical models that elucidate the causes and 
effects of interplay between or am ong institutions.
In a series of studies on international resource management, Stokke 
(2001a; see also 2000, 2001b) proposed a set of four causal pathways 
through which institutional interaction may influence the effectiveness 
of the regimes involved. These pathways are derived from the major 
theoretical approaches of international relations. Hence, ‘ ideational 
interaction (originally referred to as “diffusive” interaction) relates to 
“processes of learning” (Stokke 2001a, 10) and implies that the sub­
stantive or operational rules of one institution serve as models for those 
negotiating another regime. This may, for example, help understand the 
rapid spread of general normative principles such as sustainability, pre­
caution, and ecosystem management. “Normative ’ interaction refers to 
situations where the substantive or operational norms of one institution 
either contradict or validate those of another institution (e.g., in the case 
of the relationship of the W TO and MEAs). “Utilitarian” interaction 
relates to situations where decisions taken within one institution alter 
the costs and benefits of options available in another institution. Interac­
tion “management,” finally, relates to the political management of mter- 
mstitutional influence, including the deliberate coordination of activities 
under separate institutions in order to avoid normative conflict or waste
ful duplication of programmatic efforts.
Against this backdrop a group of European collaborators deve ope a 
number of theoretically derived models of causal m ech an ism s an more 
specific ideal types of in te ra c t io n  that demonstrate h o w  influence can 
travel from one institution to another (Oberthiir and G e ring
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These models provide an account of how given causes create observed 
effects (Schelling 1998). They presuppose that one institution (the source 
institution) exerts influence through a particular pathway on the nor­
mative development or effectiveness of another institution (the target in­
stitution). Causal mechanisms open the black box of the cause-effect 
relationship between or among the institutions involved (Coleman 1990,
1 23, Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, 2 1 -23 ) and provide a microfoun­
dation for the analysis of institutional interaction (George and Bennett 
2005, 135-45).
The causal mechanisms approach suggests that institutional interac­
tion is driven by one of four mutually exclusive general causal mecha­
nisms covering three levels of effectiveness of governance institutions: 
namely, output collective knowledge or norms prescribing, proscrib­
ing, or permitting behavior; outcome— behavioral change of relevant 
actors; and impact— the ultimate target of governance (Underdal 2004,
, an c apter 2 in this volume). Two causal mechanisms are located 
a11 e output level and exert influence on the decision-making process of 
t e target institution. A third causal mechanism is located at the outcome 
ve , mvo ving changes of behavior of relevant actors, while the fourth 
usa mec anism occurs at the impact level. The latter tw o mechanisms
o not mo i y decision making of the target institution but rather its 
ctiveness within its issue area. The four causal mechanisms are 
e ieve to cover the full range of fundamental rationales that may drive 
institutional interaction. M ore specific ideal types are needed, however,
. VC . eses about the conditions under which institutional in­
expected to occur and its consequences for e n v iro n m e n ta l
governance.
Institutlonal interaction can be driven by the 
action °  K n° T  e ge.ancl ldeas- Tile causal mechanism of cognitive inter- 
ticular f l  3SCf PUrey ° n Persuasion and may be conceived of as a par- 
the ratio” 1! 0 mtennstltutional Earning (similarly Stokke 2001a, 10). If 
caoadtv k  I °5 18 “boi^ e d ” because information-processing
informar' ° D 1972; Keohane 1984> 10 0 -1 15), or if relevant
theHreZr aVaikble’the 3Ct°rs Wl11 be P«Pared to
d e a s i o ™ l i CeS t0 ^  mf° rm atl0n <Checkel 1998; Risse 2000). The 
if information11?  j  ° f m ternational institution will be influenced
in the source^n ‘deaS Haa* 1992b) produced with-
s ltution modify the perception of decision makers oper­
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ating within the target institution. For cognitive interaction to occur, the 
source institution must generate some new information, such as a report, 
revealing, for example, new scientific or technological insights or an in­
stitutional arrangem ent solving a particular regulatory problem, which 
is subsequently fed into the decision-making process of the target institu­
tion by an actor. The information must change the order of preferences 
of actors relevant to the target institution and in this way affects the 
collective negotiation process and the output of the target institution. 
Depending on whether an interaction was triggered intentionally or not, 
we can distinguish two ideal types of cognitive interaction.
If cognitive interaction is unintentionally triggered by the source insti­
tution, members of the target institution voluntarily use some aspect of 
the source institution as a policy model. For example, the compliance 
system under the M ontreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer influenced the negotiations on the compliance system under 
the Kyoto Protocol on climate change because it provided a model of 
how to supervise implementation and deal with cases of possible non- 
compliance (Oberthiir and O tt 1999, 215-22). This type of cognitive in­
teraction can occur between any two institutions, because international 
institutions share a number of functional challenges related to monitor­
ing, verification, enforcement, and decision making. Also, numerous 
types of actors may pick up the information or idea and feed it into the 
decision-making process of another institution. Learning from a policy 
model can generally be expected to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
target institution, because it presupposes that the members and subjects 
of the target institution collectively consider the model to be useful. Pol­
icy models, however, are frequently modified or adapted to ensure their 
fit with the particular needs of the target (“complex learning , see E. 
Haas 1990). The policy-model type of interaction highlights how mem­
bers of an institution can improve the effectiveness of their governance 
efforts through the cognitive interaction involved in learning from other 
institutions.
If cognitive interaction is intentionally triggered by the source institu 
tion, it takes the form of a request by the source institution for assistance 
from the target institution. For example, the World Customs Organiza­
tion adapted its customs codes in response to a request by CITES, t us 
supporting the implementation and enforcement of the latter’s trade 
restrictions (Lanchbery 2006). A request for assistance requires that the 
issue areas involved overlap, because adaptation by the target institution
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would otherwise be meaningless for the source institution. Moreover, it 
will usually be successful only if the requested adaptation is either bene­
ficial for, or at least indifferent to, the effectiveness of the target institu­
tion. Members of an institution cannot be expected to act upon external 
requests that harm their own institution. Whereas a successful request 
for assistance will generally produce synergistic or at least neutral ef­
fects for the target institution, it is intended to create a positive feedback 
effect on the source institution. Intentional cognitive interaction enables 
an institution to draw on other institutions in order to enhance its own 
effectiveness, even if it cannot exert pressure on the target institution to 
adapt its rules. The result is an instrument for furthering effective inter­
national governance.
Interaction through Commitment Normative commitments may also 
provide the power behind interaction based on the premise that interna­
tional obligations create at least some binding force on those they ad­
dress. For this form of interaction to occur, an institution must adopt 
a prescription or proscription that formally or informally commits its 
member states. Subsequently this commitment must affect the p refe rences 
and negotiating behavior of these actors in another institution, a target 
institution, in ways that influence that institution’s collective dec is ion ­
making process and output. For example, the W TO c o m m itm e n t  not to 
discriminate against imported goods renders it more difficult for WTO 
members to adopt trade sanctions within MEAs that w o u ld  re in fo rce  
the effectiveness of these institutions (Brack 2002). Activation of this 
causal mechanism requires that both memberships and issue areas over­
lap at least partially. W ithout overlapping memberships, no m em b er 
state of the target institution would be committed to  obligations estab­
lished under the source institution. And without overlapping issue areas, 
commitments established under one institution could not red e fin e  prefer­
ences related to issues dealt with under the other institution.
If the membership of one institution forms part of the membership of 
another institution, a formally independent institution is “nested” in an­
other institution with similar objectives and governance in s tru m e n ts . In ­
teraction between nested institutions constitutes a mechanism for policy 
i usion within the same policy field and creates synergies among the 
institutions involved. It is typically easier to  reach a g re e m e n t within a 
smaller (e.g., regional) than in a larger (e.g., global) in s t i tu t io n  (Snidal
94). States committed within the smaller institution may develop a
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common interest in transferring their obligations to the larger institution 
governing the same issue area. For example, the ban of trade in hazard­
ous wastes was more easily reached in a number of regional agreements 
than in the global Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of H azardous Wastes and Their Disposal, but the latter was 
subsequently heavily influenced by the regional agreements governing the 
same issue area (Clapp 1994). Interaction between nested institutions 
provides opportunities for “forum shopping” (exploration by actors of 
opportunities offered by different institutions to pursue their own inter­
ests). Its underlying rationale suggests that it will largely support the ef­
fectiveness of the target institution and occasionally also of the source 
institution. The identical objectives of the institutions generate compat­
ible priorities and render disruptive effects highly improbable, if not 
impossible.
If a group of states addresses the same issues within two institutions 
pursuing different objectives, interaction through commitment creates 
mutual disruption of the institutions involved and, therefore, a demand 
for the delimitation of jurisdictions. Typically, institutions with different 
objectives will appraise a policy measure differently, so that disputes 
about the appropriate regulation arise. Environmentally motivated trade 
restrictions may be appraised as undesirable obstacles to free trade or 
as desirable instruments supporting environmental cooperation. In situa­
tions of this type, the members of the institutions involved possess a gen­
eral interest in some sort of separation of jurisdictions in order to avoid 
fruitless regulatory competition; however, conflicting preferences regard­
ing the appropriate solution make it notoriously difficult to solve such 
problems. Jurisdictional delimitation cases pose the governance challenge 
of identifying measures honoring the basic objectives of both institutions 
involved. This does not necessarily require an overarching institutional 
structure but may be achieved through mutual adjustment of institu­
tional structures or even through careful implementation of obligations
by the addressees.
a group of actors pursues the same objectives within institutions
controlling different governance instruments, interaction through com­
mitment will produce synergistic effects because it activates an additional 
means. Such interaction occurs in two stages. First, actors committe 
under one institution transfer an obligation to  another institution. Secon , 
incorporation of the transferred obligation must mobilize an additional 
governance instrument, such as a particular form of law or a specific
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enforcement or assistance mechanism that provides an additional in­
centive to implement the obligation. For example, political agreement 
achieved at the high-level International N orth  Sea Conferences paved 
the way for the acceptance of identical obligations enshrined in hard law 
within the regime for the protection of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) 
(Skjærseth 2006). Such interaction will regularly raise the effectiveness of 
both institutions involved, because the additional governance instrument 
benefits the implementation of both institutions simultaneously.
Behavioral Interaction Institutional interaction may also be based on 
the interconnectedness of behavior across the domains of institutions. 
Behavioral interaction will occur if behavioral changes triggered by the 
source institution become relevant for the implementation of the target 
institution. This form of interaction is located at the outcome level and 
affects the performance of an international institution within its own do­
main. Relevant states and/or nonstate actors must adapt their behavior 
in response to the output produced by the source institution. The behav­
ioral changes must affect implementation behavior under the target insti­
tution in ways that are relevant for the target institution’s effectiveness. If 
the Kyoto Protocol, for example, creates incentives to  plant fast-growing 
trees in ways that encroach upon biodiversity, this undermines the per­
formance of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Jacquemont and 
Caparrôs 2002). Behavioral interaction requires that the issue areas gov­
erned by the institutions involved as well as the direct and indirect ad­
dressees of institutional obligations are close enough to  m atter to each 
other. It does not depend on a collective decision within the target insti­
tution, because it occurs as the aggregate result of the behavior of actors 
operating within the two issue areas involved.
Implications of behavioral interaction for global governance depend, 
again, on whether the institutions involved differ predominantly in their 
memberships, objectives, or governance instruments. If different (usually
erlapping) groups of actors address a given set of issues within insti- 
unions with similar objectives, behavioral interaction will always create 
synergy. Because of the matching objectives, behavioral changes will au­
tomatically^ benefit both institutions. If a group of actors addresses a set
o issues within two institutions that pursue different objectives, interac­
tion will tend to  result in disruption of the target institution, because 
e avioral changes triggered by the source institution are easily at odds
Interplay 2 OS
with the objectives o f the target institution and may thus undermine the 
latter’s performance.
Impact-Level Interaction Institutional interaction may also rest on the 
interdependence o f the ultimate governance targets of the institutions 
involved. In impact-level interaction the ultimate governance target of 
one institution, such as economic growth or the ozone layer, is directly 
influenced by side effects originating from the ultimate governance target 
of another institution. Consider a stylized example: as cod eat herring, 
successful protection of cod by one institution, resulting in a growing 
population of this species, will unintentionally decrease the population 
of herring protected by another institution. In contrast to behavioral in­
teraction, interinstitutional influence in this case does not depend on any 
action within the target institution or its domain but rests on the “func­
tional linkage” (Young 2002b, 23, 83-109) of the ultimate governance 
targets of the institutions involved at the impact level. It is increased pop­
ulation of cod, not hum an behavior, that leads directly to a decreasing 
population of herring. While impact-level interaction may rely on stable 
interdependencies of the biophysical environment, as with cod and her­
ring, functional linkages may themselves be subject to possible long­
term change. For example, economic growth promoted by the WTO 
and the resulting growth in international transport currently lead to 
increased emissions of greenhouse gases, thus undermining the effective­
ness of the global climate regime. This kind of functional interdepen­
dence, however, might one day be overcome by technical progress or
changes in production methods.
The value added by the general causal mechanisms and their sub 
types is twofold. First, the models provide a promising foundation for 
the development of an elaborated theory of institutional interaction. 
They allow for the formulation of meaningful hypotheses about the pre­
conditions for institutional interaction and in regard to the effects o 
interaction for global environmental governance. Second, they provi e 
analytical tools for use in structured analysis of empirical interaction 
cases, which can help explain how influence travels from one institution 
to another as well as which groups of actors might be involve m t 
process. Such models, however, do not replace the empirica exp orat 
°f existing interaction cases. They do not relieve the researc er 
establishing the causal relationship between the (potential y) interac g
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institutions and exploring alternative causal pathways. Moreover, they 
do not provide precise descriptions of all properties of relevant interac­
tion cases. Being deductively derived, they cannot be empirically right or 
wrong (Snidal 1985). Like game-theoretic models, they reflect the rele­
vant components of the different causal pathways that a case of interac­
tion may follow and thereby assist the empirical analysis of real-world 
situations.
Principal Research Strategies on Institutional Interaction
Research on institutional interaction adopts different perspectives. The 
new e o inquiry has not yet produced one or more standard ap- 
proac es. Meaningful studies on institutional interaction, like research 
n any ot er subject of the social sciences, have to  be founded on some 
ic assumptions about the dependent and independent variables and 
eir re ations ip. Choices made in this respect influence the research 
questions that can be pursued in a particular study.
k ° r lmpHatl>'’ research design on institutional interaction has
. se °n decisions about the role of actors and institutions. Sys- 
t-W  k T T  ,CS ac^ ress ^  causal relationship among institutions so
6 eP^ndent and the independent variables are located at 
macro evel of institutions, rather than the micro level of actors, 
of r /  1U 1£S °  'nst*tuti°na  ^ interaction, including many legal analyses 
’V " " “ "8 ¡»riscfaions, focus enttreiy on the sys- 
researrh « an ■ ^  j  j acTJV’tles mI actors. In contrast, actor-centered 
the rlpnpnrl ate^ ieS 3 ress actors either as the independent variable or 
institut 6 n T locating the other variable at the macro level of
more rrlr & eVant research may start from a given interest of one or 
tionai inteT11!- 3Ct° rS and CXplore the opportunities to exploit mstitu- 
(forum sh aCK>n an ’nstrument to pursue these interests effectively 
fecT of f lternatlVe1^  *  may focus on the undesired side ef-
establishinp “ Interaction ^ at actors must take into account when 
effects oriri ”  f ‘8ning a §iven institution. The exploration of the
state actor«; -i! a behavior of relevant states and non-
R e s Z  re&CtS “  actor'centered strategy, 
of an a l™  „  " T ' ” "31 " “ i "  also focus on dtfferent „nits 
fluence in whi^h ^ OCUS ° n Specii*c d-vadic cases of interinstitutional in- 
0ne '" '« “«on affects the normative development or
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performance of another institution (Oberthiir and Gehring 2006a, 2 6 - 
31). This perspective may require the decomposition of complex interac­
tion situations. Even a comparatively narrow interaction situation like 
the interplay between the W TO and MEAs with trade restrictions may 
turn out to be composed of several component cases running in different 
directions and passing through different causal mechanisms (Palmer, 
Chaytor, and W erksman 2006). Research, however, may also take as its 
unit of analysis the overall patterns emerging from complex interaction 
situations, which might involve several institutions and possibly many in­
dividual cases of interaction. It will then seek to develop an integrated 
view on a complex phenomenon like the relationship between MEAs 
and the W TO or the institutional setting affecting the Antarctic environ­
ment (Young 1996). This approach has therefore been called integration- 
ist (Young 2007).
Squaring these two dimensions, we get four different research strat­
egies. Each of them is particularly well suited to address certain research 
questions and ignore others. Table 6.1 illustrates the four strategies and 
indicates their core research question.
Table 6.1
Key research questions of different perspectives on institutional interaction
Unit of analysis
Case of interaction Complex interaction setting
an
al
ys
is S
ys
te
m
ic
I.
How, and with w hat effects, 
does an international institution 
influence another international 
institution?
II.
How, and with what effects, 
does an institutional interaction 
affect the institutional structure 
of the international system?
Le
ve
l 
of
A
ct
or
-c
en
te
re
d
III.
H ow  can and do actors exploit 
opportunities arising from 
institutional interaction or 
avoid undesired interaction 
effects? H ow  does institutional 
interaction frame policy choices 
of actors?
IV.
How, and with what effects, do 
actors change the institutional 
structure of the international 
system through institutional 
interaction?
Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür
Inquiries located at the system level and focusing on one or more spe­
cific cases of interaction (cell I) address the core question of how, and 
with what effects, an international institution can and does influence an­
other international institution. The focus is on institutional interaction 
effects rather than on actors’ behavioral changes. The combination of a 
systemic perspective with a case-oriented approach is particularly well 
suited for rigorous analysis of the causal mechanisms and effects of spe­
cific incidents of institutional interaction. Causal analysis requires identi­
fying a clear direction of causal influence running from one institution 
to another, which is difficult in complex situations in which the origins 
and targets of influence are not readily discernible or in which feedback 
effects occur. This research strategy has so far proved particularly popu­
lar and has supported significant theoretical development reflected in the 
determination of causal mechanisms and more specific ideal types driving 
cases of interaction (see “Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interac­
tion” above). Empirical studies of institutional interaction (as explored 
above in ‘The Growth of Empirical Analyses” ) have also (implicitly) 
employed this strategy. Likewise, studies analyzing the specific legal im­
plications of one sectoral legal system for the interpretation  of another 
one usually follow this research strategy (Wolfrum and M atz 2003).
Systemic inquiries exploring complex interaction settings (cell II) tackle 
the core question of how, and with what effects, institutional interaction 
affects the institutional structure of the international system. Because of 
the complexity of the empirical subject of inquiry, this research strategy 
will frequently start from empirical observation and description of com- 
plex settings or with a classification of interaction patterns. In contrast to 
case-specific research, it stays closer to  the actual appearances of real- 
world interaction patterns, but it may be limited in its analytical grip on 
the forces generating the observed effects. Both conceptual w ork and em­
pirical work employing this research strategy are still rare. The taxon­
omy of four different types of interaction put forward by Oran Young 
(1996; and see “ Categories for the Classification of Institutional Interac­
tion above) and the analysis of the emerging division of labor between
the W T O  and MEAs with trade restrictions (Gehring 2 0 0 7 )  p ro v id e  ten­
tative examples for this approach.
The study of specific cases of institutional interaction using an actor- 
centered approach (cell III) examines how interested actors can and do 
e to exploit opportunities arising from institutional in te ra c t io n  or to 
avoid undesired interaction effects. In contrast to  research falling into
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cells I and II, this strategy allows the application of existing theoretical 
and methodological tools for the analysis of collective-action problems 
to the issue of institutional interaction. Interaction effects are treated 
like any other effects originating from an international institution. This 
research strategy is particularly well suited for exploration of the ways 
in which actors deal strategically with expected or anticipated institu­
tional interaction in specific situations and how they exploit related 
opportunities for forum  shopping. For example, Skjserseth, Stokke, and 
Wettestad (2006) examined how actors interested in enhancing the effec­
tiveness of N orth  Sea pollution control established the North Sea Con­
ferences to exert influence on the existing Oslo-Paris Commission. M. 
Axelrod (2006) investigated actions of interested actors to protect the 
WTO agreements from undesired interaction effects originating from 
the newly negotiated Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Likewise, studies 
assessing the options for improving an interaction situation generally fol­
low this research strategy (e.g., Biermann 2001b; Oberthiir 2001; L.
Schneider, Graichen, and M atz 2005).
Actor-centered studies focusing on more complex interaction patterns 
(cell IV) seek to investigate how the efforts of actors to employ institu-<■ < ___
system. They reflect that all institutional structures originate from inter­
dependent hum an action and affect human behavior. Studies o o g 
this research strategy, however, must bridge a particularly w ie  gap 
twppn incf-i-t-ntirmc The  institutional structures o t e inte
i v  / s c c k  i u  l n v c a u g a i ^  n w w  u i v  — -------- .
tional interaction change the institutional structure of the internationa
°  • • . ____ . n t o r .
--- —r -
and nonstate actors also belong to this researc 
2008).
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The choice among these research strategies depends primarily on the 
particular research interest. Although the com bination of two or even 
more strategies in a single project is not excluded, it renders the construc­
tion of a reliable research concept more ambitious. Unless the different 
components are convincingly integrated, conceptual broadness may re­
strict analytical and theoretical depth. At the same time the different 
strategies are neither mutually exclusive nor antipodes. For example, re­
search focusing on the exploration of individual cases of interaction 
(cells I and III) may well provide a sound basis for the exploration of 
complex interaction settings (cells II and IV). Likewise, cell III research 
wi usually include insights from cell I inquiries. The research strategies 
therefore may well be employed in complementary ways.
Implications for the Understanding of International Institutions and 
Global Environmental Governance
hat are the implications of the progress made in knowledge about in- 
,interaction o^r t l^c understanding of governance institutions? 
What insights can be derived for policy making?
Understanding International Institutions
i ,S uc y^ *nternati°nal governance institutions has been dominated 
dll'p! ectlve action approach. This approach focuses almost exclu­
ra i  7 KJ °  lnternat|onal institutions (Keohane 1993) and their 
 ^ t, • esi§n against the backdrop of well-defined preferences and con- 
2001  \ t u °  mterests rc e^vant actors (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 
c h a r i  SC mf ,tLUti0ns fulfi11 auxiliary functions depending on the 
19RS1 I °  >*” 6 unc e^rty'n8 socially problematic situation (Oye 
to defin P^lSoner s ^emma situations, for example, institutions serve 
,S '  eCti,dy “  cooperation a„d as defcc-
possiblv—?  UCC transParenc>' about the cooperators' behavior, and—
stabilise c  °  ° rgamZe Sanctlons in order to  preclude free riding and 
plies a ? eratl° n (Martin l9 9 3 )- The collective -action approach im-
(unless free Val‘d ^tiona! envirr» i research on the effectiveness of interna-
(Miles et al 2002)^  8° Vernance adopts a stim ulus-response perspective
as rlflecdnglochU xM  t° C’a! PersPective, institutions are seen
xpectations of appropriate behavior and as shaping
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actors’ preferences and identities (Young 2002b, 31-32). Institutions 
constitute social practices that are not collectively decided upon, nor 
formally established, but produced, reproduced, and changed in a per­
manent interaction process of relevant actors (Wendt 1987). If actors be­
have according to existing practices, they will reproduce them. If actors 
deviate from these practices, they will contribute to their modification 
or breakdown. Hence, social practices reflect “spontaneous” institutions 
that emerge from action (Young 1982a), whereas formal institutions and 
their “ rational design” constitute but one among several ways to change
an established social practice.
Important aspects of institutional interaction can better be grasped 
analytically by the social practices approach to institutions. If the norma­
tive structure of one institution is significantly influenced by other institu­
tions, it cannot simply be traced back to existing preferences of relevant 
actors and the resulting constellation of interests. Two of the causal 
mechanisms uncovered (see “ Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Inter­
action” above)— namely, cognitive interaction and interaction through 
commitment— dem onstrate how actors’ preferences regarding issues 
dealt with by one institution can be affected by another institution. Simi­
larly, Raustiala and Victor (2004, 296) have pointed out that power, 
interests, and ideas do not map directly onto institutional decisions be­
cause they are also shaped by other institutions. At a minimum, institu­
tional interaction, in addition to exogenous interests, thus significantly 
affects and shapes the preferences of actors. Accordingly, preference for­
mation cannot easily be separated from institutional analysis.
Institutional interaction also creates new institutional structures that 
are difficult to design rationally, because they evolve gradually from, 
and are continuously shaped and reshaped by, numerous decentralized 
interaction occurrences. Interaction may lead to a particular division o 
labor of the institutions involved or to the mutual reinforcement of their 
effectiveness, as an emergent effect that is not reflected in either of these 
institutions. Such interlocking structures (Underdal and Young 2004, 
374-75) do not arise from collective bargaining or institutionalized deci­
sion making at the aggregate level. Whereas virtually all institutions in 
international environmental governance comprise their own permanent 
decision-making centers, if only in the form of a conference o t e par 
ties, no such decision-making bodies exist with respect to interaction be­
tween international institutions. Although the EU and domestic po itica 
systems possess unitary institutional frameworks that can a ress
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issues, the international system lacks a similar capacity. To the extent 
that overarching institutions like the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties or the International Court of Justice exist, they play a limited 
role at best. Under these circumstances interaction emerges from, and is 
influenced by, decentralized decisions made within any of the institutions 
involved and the behavior of individual actors. Far from being designed, 
interaction thus evolves and is produced and reproduced through the 
practices of relevant actors.
If institutional interaction affects the implementation of obligations 
established under international institutions, it will modify the meaning 
of these obligations. The causal mechanism of behavioral interaction 
emonstrates how an institution can affect the effectiveness of another 
institution at the outcome level (see “Causal M echanisms of Institutional 
nteraction above). Even if the formal rules of the target institution 
remain unchanged, their effects and their meaning as reflected in the so­
cial practices of relevant actors change significantly. Similarly, Raustiala 
an Victor (2004, 302) suggest that interacting institutions may address 
ega inconsistencies by means of mutual adaptation during implementa- 
on. W ereas the collective-action approach assumes from a top-down 
perspective that actors implement fixed regime rules (unless free riding 
occurs), institutional interaction highlights tha t the social practices 
emerging in the implementation of one institution may also be shaped 
th Cr . r t,tUtK>m' toP_down implementation perspective may 
us provi e a valuable first cut, but it does not encompass the effects of 
institutional interaction at the outcome level.
Implications for Policy Making
The progress of research on institutional interaction achieved so far has 
several implications for policy making. First, institutional interaction 
requires that policy making take into account the broader policy impli­
cations of particular governance projects. Research o f the past decade 
has demonstrated the importance of interinstitutional effects at all three 
levels of effectiveness: output, outcome, and impact. It is now estab­
lished that environmental governance is frequently the result of several 
institutions and that an institution often has implications for other insti­
tutions. Skillful policy making will have to  consider the existence of 
several institutions cogoverning an issue area. Accordingly, the insti­
tutional environment of the institution in which a policy initiative is 
aunched will most likely have repercussions for its prospects of success
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regarding acceptance by other actors and effective implementation. 
And vice versa: the assessment of the impact of a policy initiative on 
an institution should take into account “side effects” on and from other 
institutions.
While to some extent constraining policy making, institutional inter­
action offers a wealth of new opportunities. Since the normative devel­
opment of an institution can be influenced not only from within that 
institution but also by other institutions, actors may engage in forum 
shopping (Gillespie 2002; Raustiala and Victor 2004, 299-300). To the 
extent that issue areas overlap, actors can choose the most suitable insti­
tution for a policy initiative. They can develop integrated strategies for 
the pursuit of their preferences that take into consideration the potential 
of the varying institutions affecting an issue area for both norm making 
and implementation. Interested actors might even establish a new institu­
tion with the sole purpose of influencing an existing one, as the North 
Sea riparian states did with the establishment of the International North 
Sea Conferences directed at strengthening the existing OSPAR Com­
mission (Skjærseth 2006). M oreover, they may create “strategic incon­
sistency” (Raustiala and Victor 2004, 301), causing disruption of an 
unwanted institution o r regulation in order to increase the pressure for
its revision or cancellation.
The research results have im portant implications for discussion about 
the reform of international environmental governance and the political 
management of institutional interaction. This discussion has so far fo­
cused mainly on the potential for institutional coordination and integra­
tion at the international level, most importantly by establishing a WEO 
(Biermann and Bauer 2005; Chambers and Green 2005; Najam, Papa, 
and Taiyab 2006). Findings of research on institutional interaction chal­
lenge this debate in several ways.
First, synergy among institutions has been found to be at least as 
common as disruption (see “Synergy and Conflict” above). This finding 
contradicts the presumption of most contributions to the debate on 
reforming international environmental governance that institutional in 
teraction might primarily constitute a problem because it creates ’n e^r'^ * 
stitutional conflict and tension. If this presumption is revised, both the 
rationale for reform proposals and the yardstick for assessing their effec­
tiveness need to be adapted. In particular, institutional reform proposals 
will have to  dem onstrate that they can, in addition to mitigating con ict, 
preserve and enhance synergy among institutions.
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Second, institutional interaction research suggests that the institutional 
fragmentation of international environmental governance may constitute 
a strength rather than a weakness. Institutions with large regulatory 
overlaps appear to create substantial added benefit if they employ com­
plementary governance instruments, represent different memberships, or 
provide for significantly different decision-making procedures. W hat may 
at first sight appear as a ‘duplication of w ork” o r “ redundancy” arising 
from institutional fragmentation, which is commonly deplored by policy 
makers and in the relevant literature, is in fact frequently a sign of effec­
tive governance. Slight differences in the instruments or procedures em­
ployed or the memberships of the institutions can make two (or more) 
institutions contribute in complementary ways to  effective governance, 
as is best illustrated in the ideal type of interaction activating an “addi­
tional means (see Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction” 
a ■>°ve). Regulatory competition among different forums can help prevent 
institutional sclerosis and provide an im portant driver of overall prog­
ress. Before pursuing a reduction of seeming “duplication of w ork,” for 
instance, through a WEO or through the clustering of functionally re- 
ated institutions or elements of institutions in global environmental gov­
ernance (Oberthür 2002; von M oltke 2005), policy makers and analysts 
would be well advised to check carefully the “ hidden” added value of the 
current fragmented arrangements.
Third, research indicates that disruption am ong international institu­
ions is main y rooted in competing institutional objectives, as is ap- 
. jurisdictional delimitation type of interaction through
“ C m T T “  t*1C Coroliary t .vPe ° f  behavioral interaction (see 
^ u s a l  Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction” above). Accordingly,
, ni ProPosa s would have to show how they promise to  mitigate 
o h , . r n'm' r / ntennStitUti0nal dis™P"<>" and to reconcile diverging 
Itaives of the institutions involved. For example, building a unitary 
j^tutional framework in the form of a W EO does no t as such pro­
jective fS° |Ve r C track '° f f  ^etween the competing environmental ob- 
foresr m ° ° ^  tllC Protection of biodiversity regarding 
a WF0 ana8eT nt' !tr WOulcl also rctluire further clarification of how 
with nnn ^  ° rm ProPosa s^ would help mediate trade-offs
^ n o n e n v u o n m e n ta l  objectives pursued by inst.tutions such as the
the heg lm ony^f Cha? enge the conventional wlsdom ° fvis-a-vis MEAs. The jurisdictional délimita-
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tion type of interaction demonstrates that power is involved when it 
comes to defining the division of labor among institutions with com­
peting objectives. Environmental institutions have proved remarkably 
strong in comparison with the WTO. Several environmental institutions 
have successfully created “strategic inconsistency” by regulating particu­
lar areas of international trade as such or employing trade measures as 
an enforcement tool. As a result they have limited the implications of 
the existing free-trade rules and have carved out certain areas of the reg­
ulatory authority of the W TO (see “The World Trade Organization and 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements” above).
Future research on institutional interaction holds the promise of fur­
ther valuable input to policy debates. In particular, knowledge about ef­
fective interaction m anagement has remained sharply limited to date. As 
research on institutional interaction advances, it could provide a more 
solid basis for exploring options for such management.
Vertical Interaction
Frequently environmental governance involves institutions located at dif­
ferent levels of social or administrative organization, most importantly 
the international, the national, and the local levels. This creates a vertical 
dimension of institutional interaction as identified in the IDGEC Science 
Plan (Young et al. 1999/2005) as well as in related publications (Young 
2002b). Vertical interaction has been studied almost entirely separately 
from horizontal interaction, although this separation may be predomi­
nantly the result of research interests and scholarly discourses rather 
than theoretical considerations. The causal mechanisms discussed above 
maY turn out to provide an instrument for the theoretical integration of
the two perspectives.
Studies on the vertical interaction between the national and the local 
!evels draw upon and expand the discussion on the preservation of 
the local commons. The “tragedy of local commons” (Ostrom et al. 
2002; also Ostrom  1990) and the social problems of local communities 
tfying to establish reliable institutional solutions for the management 
and preservation of commons such as water resources or common s 
ing grounds through self-organization have been studied for a long 
time. Case studies treat national measures such as the introduction o 
Property rights that were found to interfere with local solutions as unde­
sired external factors. The vertical-interaction perspective addresses such
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interference as interaction between local and national institutions 
(Young 2002c, 266-76). As in the case of horizontal interaction, vertical 
interaction can be disruptive or synergistic, and authors have been pri­
marily preoccupied with cases of disruption, mainly of well-operating 
local institutions by national institutions. In many cases national political 
institutions resulting in centralization of decision making, nationalization 
of resources, increased participation in markets, and priority for develop­
ment policies have indeed been found to affect established local institu­
tions adversely and to lead to the degradation of the local commons 
that had been effectively preserved in the past (Lebel 2005). In the face 
also of the “tragedy of the commons,” with its implication of incentives 
for free riding, local communities nevertheless may also benefit from sup­
port of institutions located at a higher level of social organization (Berkes 
2006b). Intervention by national institutions is reported to strengthen or 
rejuvenate local-level institutions, for example, by state recognition of 
local institutions, development of enabling legislation, cultural revitaliza­
tion, capacity building, and local institution building (see Berkes 2002, 
296-300).
Although the literature has so far predominantly focused on the top- 
down influence of national on local institutions, vertical interaction con­
ceptually covers a broader realm. It broadens the research agenda to 
encompass interinstitutional influences of all sorts across all levels of 
social and administrative organization. For example, national political 
systems may both benefit from and be harmed by regional or global 
institutions.
Vertical-interaction research is particularly related to  the issue of scale 
(Gupta, chapter 7 in this volume) but should not be confused with it. 
Determining the appropriate level of institutional action stays central to 
the discussion of the appropriate “scaling” of an environmental problem 
(Young 2002b; Cash et al. 2006). The issue of scale raises concerns of 
effectiveness (at which level is a problem to be addressed to be solved 
effectively?) as well as power and interest (at which level do particular 
actors want it to be dealt with?). Although the lower levels of social or­
ganization may be closer to the environmental targets and the related 
human activities, effective solutions of many problems require coopera­
tion at higher levels of social organization. In any event, scaling must 
not be conflated with vertical interaction. Even if the scaling up of 
an issue to a higher level of social and administrative o rg a n iz a t io n  will
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almost inevitably cause vertical interaction between or among institu­
tions located at different levels, vertical interaction addresses the distinct 
issue of interinstitutional influence.
Institutionalized comanagement has been the preferred solution to 
conflictual interaction between national and local institutions identified 
in the literature. The prim ary solution observed by researchers for the 
management or mitigation of such conflicts involves comanagement ini­
tiatives with formal power sharing. Many comanagement arrangements, 
sometimes including stakeholder bodies, exist in the areas of fisheries, 
wildlife, protected areas, forests, and other resources in various parts of 
the world. They range from joint forest management in India to the im­
plementation of aboriginal resource rights in the United States, Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia (Berkes 2002, 301-7). From a more con­
ceptual perspective, possible solutions that do not rely on comanagement 
have received less attention. These include the gradual separation of the 
jurisdictions of the institutions involved, their merger, or the dominance 
of one of the interacting institutions (Young 2006). It is not clear, how­
ever, whether, or under which conditions, the effects of these solutions 
are malign or benign for environmental protection.
Interactions between or among local and national institutions domi­
nate the discussion. Vertical interaction at higher levels of social organi­
zation occurs particularly between the national and the international 
levels (Young 2002c, 276-83). Independently from the relatively new 
framework of vertical interaction, the bottom-up influence exerted by 
domestic political systems on the shape and development of international 
institutions h a s  been addressed under the “cooperation under anarchy 
heading (Keohane 1984; Oye 1985). This perspective holds that oppor­
tunities for cooperation depend on the constellation of interests of the 
actors involved. Although states are here conceptualized as unitary 
actors whose interests may be shaped by national-level institutions, they 
constitute group actors that are, in fact, themselves institutions. Research 
on policy making within the EU revealed that national administrations 
frequently seek to establish their own domestically institutionalized solu­
tions within the higher-level institution (Héritier, Knill, and Mmgers 
!996). The influence of in te rn a t io n a l  institutions on national political 
systems and institutions had also been intensely discussed long before 
issues of interaction appeared on the agenda (Chayes and Chayes 1993; 
Cowles 2001). The implementation of international rules has been foun
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to depend not least on the compatibility of international commitments 
with domestic institutions (see Galaz et al., chapter 5 in this volume). It 
follows that the concept of multilevel governance becomes an applicable 
lens for examination of the increasingly dense interaction between the 
EU and the political systems of its member states (Hooghe and Marks 
2003).
While research on vertical interaction is still a t an early stage, compo­
nents of a common analytical framework and research agenda are evolv­
ing. Existing studies have so far a t best focused on limited numbers of 
cases of institutional interaction, and there is a lack of larger compara­
tive studies. Efforts have been made, however, to  reexamine existing 
case studies in a comparative manner in order to  extract more abstract 
an conceptually founded insights. In particular, the demand for support
o oca institutions by institutions located at higher levels of social orga­
nization (Berkes 2006b) and existing institutional solutions for malign 
n n r i ? ! 011 pr° blems have been assessed (Berkes 2002). Likewise, Young 
i j j S made attemPts to develop a comprehensive analytical frame- 
or a ressing the relationships between or am ong the interacting
i utions, their core differences, the causal mechanisms tha t drive ver-
1 n)nm^t'0n, an<^  ^  consecIuences ° f  that interaction (see also Cash 
et ai. 2006). Although this work will have to  be expanded to develop
endeavor °  VmiCal interaction> it provides a solid foundation for this
wn If Vtr'7 C^W have been made between w ork on vertical and
II Tk onzonta  ^ interaction, the tw o research areas overlap empiri-
l , | VV°  research communities have so far almost entirely ignored 
terari-' ^ e’t i^er our own apprpach tow ard horizontal in-
tual i 611 m  and Gehnng 2006c) nor the most im portant concep- 
Y o u t W n n ^ 0nS t0 VmiCa! interaction (Berkes 2002; Cash et al. 2006; 
Youno i in n u v 'j -  ^  single publication of the other domain. Likewise, 
elahor t t lscusses horizontal and vertical interaction within his 
Z p T r l T f  IDGEC SC,CnCe Pl3n ln - P - « e  chapters. The 
where t h / f  Vert’ca\  'nteraction overlaps, however, particularly
gional instinCfUS Ce" ^ rS ° n interplay between or am ong global and re-
tionship betweTiTthe E U T ^  ■ addressed the vertical rd a ' 
well as bptwp l u i international institutions (Coffey 2006) as
L s T f 1 8 ,and f 8'0nal ‘nternat'°„al ins,,,u,ions. Also, cer- 
causa mechanisms of interaction through commitment
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and behavioral interaction are particularly relevant for this relationship 
(see “Causal M echanisms of Institutional Interaction” above). Interac­
tion among nested institutions and interaction activating an additional 
means are particularly prom inent types of vertical interaction between 
international institutions and EU legal instruments. Obligations agreed 
at the EU level provide a solid foundation for EU leadership in inter­
national institutions so as to internationalize the EU standard, and 
implementation of international obligations into EU law activates the 
particular supranational enforcement powers of the EU, which supports 
compliance by EU member states (Gehring and Oberthiir 2006). Other 
studies have explored vertical interactions between regional and global 
institutions in several areas of environmental governance (Stokke 2001a; 
Meinke 2002). Investigating from another angle, Berkes (2006b) dis­
cusses regional institutions for the protection of certain fish stocks as 
intermediaries between the global institutions and the national and local 
ones.
Despite some differences, there is no theoretical reason to believe that 
vertical interaction operates fundamentally differently from horizontal 
interaction. Institutions located at different levels of social organization 
are hierarchically ordered, with a local institution operating in the 
shadow of a national one and a national one in the shadow of an inter­
national one. In contrast, international institutions, especially those that 
interact horizontally, are usually formally established independently of 
each other. Formal (jurisdictional) hierarchy must not be conflated with 
influence per se, as is seen in the well-known resistance of local or na­
tional institutions to the implementation of higher-order commitments. 
Equally, the frequent formal independence of institutions in horizontal- 
interaction settings does no t imply the absence of influence. Although the 
particularities of influence may differ considerably, vertical interaction 
may be expected to resemble horizontal interaction in many respects.
Accordingly, lessons may be drawn from one strand of research for the 
other. It may turn out, for example, that vertical interaction frequently 
runs in both directions, rather than predominantly targeting lower leve 
institutions. As has been found in research on scale, vertical interaction 
may also open opportunities for the deliberate choice of an appropriate 
level as a particular form of “forum shopping” (see Gupta, chapter 7 in 
this volume) if regulation at different levels of social and administrative 
organization becomes, to  some degree, functionally equivalent.
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Future Research Directions
Recent advances in knowledge about institutional interaction provide 
fertile ground for future research. As outlined, research on institutional 
interaction has made im portant headway over the past decade or so. 
Rather than exhausting the field, this progress enables us to identify a 
wealth of new research opportunities.
The Development of a Theory of Institutional Interaction
Theory development in this area has just begun. M ore reliable theo­
retical knowledge on important aspects of institutional interaction is 
needed. To be able to detect hidden instances of interaction and formu­
late reliable advice for policy makers requires a theory of the condi­
tions under which institutions tend to  influence each other’s normative 
development or effectiveness. The existing theoretically derived causal 
mechanisms and their subtypes may provide a promising foundation for 
the development of an expanded theory of institutional interaction. For 
this purpose the concept needs to  be enlarged and elaborated in at least 
two directions. First, the models do not yet contain reliable informa' 
tion about the sufficient conditions under which the respective causal 
mechanisms are triggered. Second, knowledge about the development 
of institutional interaction situations is waiting to  be systematically 
developed. Do the actors involved tend tow ard full exploitation of the 
synergies inherent in a situation, or do such opportunities remain unex­
ploited? Do actors succeed over time in minimizing or avoiding disrup­
tion among institutions with different objectives, or does conflict tend 
to prevail? The patterns of the many cases of institutional interaction
that have as yet received little attention could also be more in tensively  
studied.
Empirical Knowledge
Such knowledge is still largely lacking in a num ber of im portant areas of 
institutional interaction. First, as observed above, the majority of exist' 
ing case studies on instances of institutional interaction has focused on a 
limited number of interaction settings, including the W TO-M EA inter­
face, interactions involving the climate change regime, as well as issues 
related to the governance of the oceans and the broadly discussed foun- 
ation of a WEO. Effects of institutional interaction in other areas, such 
as governance of chemicals or the preservation of biodiversity, have
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received far less attention. While analysis of interaction in these fields can 
use existing analytical tools, it might reveal yet unknown patterns of in­
teraction and thus contribute to the progress of generalized institutional 
knowledge. Second, still very little is known about the significance of 
institutional interaction both generally and in specific cases. The efficient 
management of interaction situations depends on a more precise assess­
ment of the significance of interaction effects. Finally, we need more 
comparative and large-« studies that allow systematic comparison of a 
smaller or larger num ber of interaction cases or situations. Such com­
parative studies promise to  generate inductively generalized knowledge. 
Theoretical insights on such issues as the development of patterns of in­
teraction situations can hardly be derived deductively. They must be 
founded on the systematic and comparative assessment, or even on quan­
titative studies, of an appropriate number of cases in a structured and fo­
cused manner.
Interaction M anagem ent
So far, interaction management remains underresearched. Besides a num­
ber of contributions looking into the general legal instruments available 
(e-g., W olfrum and M atz 2003), the exploration of the kinds of policy 
responses that are, or could be, applied by actors in order to enhance 
synergy and mitigate or prevent conflict is still a t its very beginning (van 
Asselt 2006). Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little is known about what 
policy responses various actors have applied at the various levels so far 
and how they have performed. M ore empirical research into existing pol 
'ey responses and their performance over time may provide the most 
suitable starting point for thinking about further policy options for en­
hancing synergy and mitigating conflict as well as conditions for their 
successful implementation. The systematic assessment of interaction 
management (Stokke 2001a) will have to focus on different sorts of pol­
icy responses. Actors may respond unilaterally to institutional interaction 
•ssues in the implementation of institutional commitments. Members of 
°ne institution involved in an interaction situation may also collectively 
attempt to manage related ch a lle n g e s , as is evident in the ideal type of an 
interinstitutional request for assistance (see “Causal Mechanisms o 1° 
stitutional Interaction” above). Actors may even strive for the coordina- 
tion of interaction management in an overarching framework spanning 
several or all of the institutions involved in a certain situation (see a so 
Gehring and O berthür 2006, 314-16).
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The management of impact-level interaction constitutes a particularly 
challenging task. This type of interaction addresses the functional inter- 
linkage of the ultimate targets of the institutions involved. Whereas this 
interlinkage relies in some cases on barely modifiable biophysical facts, 
in other cases it may be subject to long-term change that might be influ­
enced by skillful management. For example, environmental protection 
will in the long run depend not least on the successful decoupling of eco­
nomic growth (the ultimate target of the W TO) from the global climate 
(the ultimate target of the climate change regime). Such management will 
have to occur at least partially outside these institutions and within one 
or more other institutions, fostering, for example, energy efficiency or the 
development of new technologies, or governing traffic.
Institutional Complexes and Broader Governance Structures
These wider topics have so far largely escaped theoretically guided re- 
searc . Exploring systematically the nature, evolution, and consequences
o sets of institutions that cogovern particular issue areas promises more 
integrated understanding (Raustiala and Victor 2004). M ost important 
will be knowledge of the particular division of labor that develops over 
time among a number of institutions cogoverning an issue area or of
■ ^*th 'Overlapping issue areas. It is one thing to examine how
f ,C a ects relevant MEAs, or vice versa, and quite a n o th e r  to ex-
p ore ow t e overlapping area of environmentally motivated trade 
strictions is jointly governed by these institutions. Unlike the sector-
Y  C onn!<tUt'0nii aiV°^VCC^  sucb ‘nterlocking structures (Underdal and 
oung ) are not the product of more or less rational design, since 
y emerge tacitly from interaction among several international, re- 
g na , an even domestic institutions. Cases of interaction may form se- 
th lT f3 a  uln i S°  ^ at 3n ‘H^ividiial case gives rise to a subsequent case 
jn„ - 66 S “  on tile °rigmal source institution or influences a third 
anH ' 10n • 3SeS °  n^teract*on may also cluster around certain issues 
DarrirnSltltUtl°ui ^  ^  W3y 3 number of institutions jointly address a 
cerrlin ^  COntribute to the effectiveness of governance of a
eent” ^  & • OI?^ tX *nteract*on situations raise the problem of “emer-
actionPirn°PertieS SC thCy may be affected by 80 many cases of intef~ 
inherent inTlT S°  ™ expectec* ^ a t  new properties emerge that are not 
could start .e, Smg Cases- The analysis, then, of complex interactions 
cases involved an assessment of the coexistence of the single-interaction
cases involved (Gehnng and Oberthür 2006, 358-67).
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Future Research on Vertical Interaction
This dimension of interaction has to  date received much less systematic 
attention than horizontal interaction. The theoretical exploration of the 
origins, types, and consequences of cases and instances of such interac­
tion has only just begun. It is still largely based upon the secondary 
assessment of existing case studies. It would thus benefit from the sys­
tematic comparison of well-selected cases of vertical interaction across 
levels, including a comparison of cases linking the local to the national 
level with cases linking the local to the global level and cases linking the 
national to the global level. Eventually the aim would be to develop the­
oretical models of the causal mechanisms and types of interaction that 
reveal information not only on how causal influence is transferred, but 
also on the conditions of its occurrence and its consequences for environ­
mental governance. Also needed are theoretically sound and empirically 
reliable conceptions of the different types of division of labor between or 
among institutions located at different levels of social organization as 
well as the implications for environmental governance. In some respects 
the study of vertical interaction might be advanced by employing, or 
adapting, the analytical tools developed in the area of horizontal inter­
action. The result could be a more encompassing theory of institutional 
interaction that accounts for both horizontal and vertical interaction.
We do not claim that this list of research topics is exhaustive. It is 
meant to  identify a num ber of core avenues that future research efforts 
may travel in building on past research. Research in the indicated areas 
promises to  advance not only our knowledge about institutional interac­
tion as such bu t also our u n d e rs ta n d in g  of environmental governance
more broadly.
Note
1- A diversity of terms can be found in the literature to denote the phenomena 
subsumed here under institutional interaction, including interp ay , in r
linkage, overlap, and interconnection (see, e.g., Herr an 13 ’ Y° 
2000; Young et al. 1999/2005; Young 2002b; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Young
et al. 2008). We use the term interaction in this chapter.
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